https://law.justia.com/cases/maine/supreme-court/1987/535-a-2d-913-0.html

535 A.2d 913 (1987)
State of Maine v. Lionel Cormier
Supreme Judicial Court of Maine.
Argued November 9, 1987.
Decided December 31, 1987.

 R. Christopher Almy, Dist. Atty., Philip C. Worden (orally), Asst. Dist. Atty., Bangor, for plaintiff.
 Martha J. Harris (orally), Paine, Lynch & Harris, P.A., Bangor, for defendant.
Before McKUSICK, C.J., and NICHOLS, WATHEN, GLASSMAN, SCOLNIK and CLIFFORD, JJ.
 
CLIFFORD, Justice.

The defendant, Lionel Cormier, appeals from a judgment of the Superior Court, Penobscot County, following a trial by jury in August, 1986. Cormier was convicted on two counts of robbery, 17-A M.R.S.A. § 651 (Class A) (1983), and one count of aggravated assault, 17-A M.R.S.A. § 208 (Class B) (1983). We affirm the judgment.

I

II

III.

Cormier's next argument is that his conviction should be vacated because of allegedly perjured testimony. Cormier claims that Sergeant Shuman perjured himself when Shuman testified that he did not know of the robberies prior to his interview with Pollard in 1985. During cross-examination, Cormier's counsel confronted Shuman with a transcript of an interview he had conducted with Richard Sargent's wife [error], Sharon Sargent, on July 24, 1984. During the interview, Shuman discussed the robberies with Ms. Sargent, indicating that he had knowledge of the robberies prior to his interview with Pollard. Cormier's counsel stressed this inconsistency in Shuman's testimony in her final argument to the jury.

The alleged use of the perjured testimony was also the subject of evidence Cormier presented at the hearing on his motion for a new trial. During that hearing, Cormier introduced two other interviews conducted by Shuman, not used at trial,[3] as well as the interview with Sharon Sargent. Cormier contends that these interviews demonstrate Shuman's awareness of the robberies prior to his interview with Pollard, and that he should have been granted a new trial on that basis.

Although the knowing use of perjured testimony by the State in a criminal trial is a fundamental due process violation, see Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, 269, 79 S. Ct. 1173, 1177, 3 L. Ed. 2d 1217 (1959); State v. Brunette, 501 A.2d 419, 423 (Me. 1985) the testimony of Sergeant Shuman on his prior knowledge of the robberies, although substantially inconsistent, does not rise to the level of being knowingly perjured. Moreover, the inconsistencies were known to Cormier's counsel and argued to the jury."

IV

V

VI

The entry is: Judgment affirmed. All concurring

NOTES

[1] It is unclear from the record which Sargent brother went into the victim's house with Cormier.